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 I
 We have been drawn to the subject of this paper by recent strong
 manifestations of public interest in two major problems in internation-
 al relations: first, the migration of highly skilled individuals to the
 U.S.-often referred to as the "brain drain"-and, second, the large-
 scale program of training foreign students in the U.S. Both of these
 problems have in common that they involve an international transfer
 of resources in the form of human capital that goes completely unre-
 corded in any official balance-of-payments statistics. This common fea-
 ture clearly defines our field of analysis and excludes problems associ-
 ated with the transfer of human capital services, such as occur in con-
 nection with the Peace Corps, programs of technical assistance
 through governmental agencies, technical and scientific advice by pri-
 vate corporations, etc.-all of which are reflected in official balance-of-
 payments statistics.
 We have prepared some empirical estimates of the U.S. balance of
 trade in human capital from foreign student exchange and the immi-
 gration of scientists and engineers, which will shortly be published.
 These studies, while involving interesting conceptual problems of mea-
 surement, produced no startling results and suggest that in comparison
 with the size of the U.S. economy these capital flows are quite small.
 We present here only a few summary statistics to give an impression
 of the nature of the empirical results we have obtained. First, it turns
 out that the total U.S. program of foreign college student exchange,
 involving 58,000 foreig n students in the U.S. and 11,000 American stu-
 dents abroad, resulted in a maximum net U.S. cost of only $17 million
 in 1962, after appropriate adjustment of the gross cost for the human
 capital value of students electing to remain in the U.S. Second, the
 total human capital value of scientists and engineers immigrating to
 the U.S. during the thirteen-year period from 1949 to 1961 came to
 $1.0 billion. Third, the role of foreigners in the American economics
 profession estimated on the basis of the National Science Foundation
 survey statistics is as follows: 12 percent are foreign born, 9 percent
 had also foreign high school training, but only 3 percent earned their
 * This paper is part of a larger study concerned wvith the international migration of
 highly trained people, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and directed by Harry G.
 Johnson, whom we thank for his support, both intellectual and financial.
 268
 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 269
 highest professional degree abroad. Fourth, the shares of annual out-
 put of first-degree engineers lost by emigration to the U.S. by some
 major individual countries were found to differ widely between coun-
 tries and tended to be surprisingly high in some instances. For exam-
 ple, Norway lost 24.1 percent, Greece 20.9 percent, Germany 9.5 per-
 cent, and France 1.2 percent of their annual output of first-degree en-
 gineers to the U.S. Finally, scientists and engineers are from six to
 twelve times as likely to emigrate to the U.S. as people in other profes-
 sions, judging from the occupational composition of all immigrants and
 that of the labor force in the migrants' native countries.
 While such empirical work sheds light on the quantitative impor-
 tance of issues which all too often are argued in complete ignorance of
 any facts, we have found that nearly all discussions of the brain drain
 and exchange student programs suffer most seriously from the absence
 of any theoretical framework. The main part of this paper is devoted
 to a theoretical analysis of issues surrounding the international flow of
 human capital embodied in highly skilled migrants to the U.S. and in
 foreign students electing not to return to their native countries.
 II
 The argument that a country "loses" by the emigration of highly
 skilled individuals is most nearly always valid when we consider the
 CCcountry" to be a nation state whose national objective is to maximize
 its military and economic power. From this point of view, a person's
 emigration absolutely reduces his country's mobilizable manpower,
 and its national output is lowered by the amount the emigrant con-
 tributed to it.
 While this view of national losses is held quite widely, it is sorely
 outmoded in our age. The identification of military power with the
 number of a country's inhabitants, even if they are hlghly skilled, is
 very vague and precarious. Wealth, science, and technology dominate
 modern warfare, and it is quite easy for most nations to purchase mili-
 tary equipment on the world market at costs much below those that
 would have to be incurred in the development of individual national
 weapons systems. Economic power, in turn, depends not so much on
 aggregate national output as it does on per capita income, which may
 or may not be affected by an individual's emigration.
 In place of this outmoded nationalist concept of a country, we sug-
 gest the use of another one, according to which a country is an associa-
 tion of individuals whose collective welfare its leaders seek to maxi-
 mize. While the level of individual welfare is determined by many fac-
 tors, including items of collective consumption such as military might
 and foreign economic influence, the most important determinant of
 2 70 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
 human welfare in the long run is the standard of living; that is, the
 quantity of goods and services available for consumption. Therefore,
 in the following analysis we will focus our attention on the changes in
 income brought about by the emigration of highly skilled individuals.
 If a country wishes to maximize the income available to all its peo-
 ple, then emigration should be welcomed whenever two conditions are
 met. These are, first, that the emigrant improves his own income and,
 second, that the migrant's departure does not reduce the income of
 those remaining behind. The first condition is normally met when emi-
 gration is voluntary. Specification of the circumstances under which
 the second holds true will occupy the rest of this paper.
 III
 According to the traditional analysis of the migration of labor, the
 departure of a person normally raises the long-run average income of
 the people remaining, because it results in an increase in the nation's
 capital-labor ratio. In the case of the migration of a highly skilled per-
 son, however, this conclusion does not hold if the human capital em-
 bodied in the emigrant is greater than the country's total per capita
 endowment of human and physical capital, assuming perfect substituta-
 bility of the two forms of capital in the long run. In this case the emi-
 gration of a highly skilled person reduces the total income to be dis-
 tributed among the residents of a country and it follows that in soci-
 eties where this distribution occurs through planning or other nonmar-
 ket means the remaining population suffers a reduction in welfare.
 In a market economy where persons are paid their marginal prod-
 uct, however, such a reduction in per capita income is only a statistical
 phenomenon which has no influence on the welfare of the remaining
 people: the emigrant removes both his contribution to national out-
 put and the income that gives him a claim to this share, so that other
 incomes remain unchanged. There may be income redistribution effects
 through changes in the marginal products of the remaining people, but
 since the brain drain involves rather small numbers of people, these
 effects are likely to be small enough to be safely considered negligible.
 Thus it follows that in a market economy any effects that the emi-
 gration of a highly skilled person is likely to have on the welfare on
 those remaining behind must be sought either in short-run adjustment
 costs or in market failures.
 The short-run costs are due to production losses-specifically those
 created by the unemployment or inefficient employment of factors of
 production whose effectiveness depends on cooperation with the skills
 the departing person takes along. The size of these costs depends on
 two elements. First, the greater the short-run substitutability of other
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 factors of production or skills for those that have emigrated, the small-
 er the inefficiencies and loss of output. Second, the more rapidly a re-
 placement for the emigrant can be trained, the smaller the losses. It is
 difficult to generalize about the characteristics of individual profes-
 sions or national education systems in regard to these qualities, but it
 seems reasonable to expect that the emigration of a well-established,
 experienced professional will cause greater frictional losses than would
 the emigration of a common laborer or the decision of a student not to
 return home. Also, we would expect that bursts of heavy emigration
 alternating with periods of low emigration rates present more difficult
 adjustment problems than do steady flows, even if the latter represent
 a greater long-run average than do the former, because of the econo-
 my's likely structural adjustments to predictable changes.
 Of greater analytical interest than these short-run costs of adjust-
 ment to emigration are the long-run effects on welfare associated with
 failures of the free market to allocate resources efficiently. There are
 two main sources of such inefficiencies which appear to underlie most
 of the arguments about losses from the emigration of highly skilled
 persons.
 The first category of losses has to do with genuine externalities,
 where the market fails properly to compensate the individual for the
 contributions he makes to society. It is important to note that these
 externalities must be directly associated wvith the personal character-
 istics of the emigrant and not his profession. Thus, if a typical doctor's
 work contains a large measure of social benefits for which he does not
 get compensated, these benefits are lost to society only for the length
 of time required to train another person to take his place as a doctor.
 It therefore follows that in many of the well-known instances of genu-
 ine external effects in consumption or production, emigration imposes
 only short-run frictional costs to society which disappear in the long
 run.
 While it is difficult enough to find genuine cases of economically
 significant externalities in the real world, it is even more difficult to
 find cases which have the added limitation of being associated with a
 specific person. Examples coming to mind are the external disecono-
 mies from alcoholism or the nonmarket benefits accruing to others
 from a person's propensity to engage in political or charity work with-
 out monetary compensation. The difficulty of finding meaningful ex-
 amples may legitimately be taken as an indication of the relative un-
 importance of most externalities given the size of the resources allocat-
 ed through properly functioning markets.
 The second category of losses stems from market failure remedied
 through activities of the government. It is alleged that the emigration
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 of highly skilled persons affects others most significantly through
 changes in the cost of providing such government services.
 In this connection, it is frequently suggested that public education is
 a social investment in individuals which emigrants fail to repay, and
 that therefore the highly trained in particular ought to be forced to
 repay this investment before they are allowed to leave the country.
 Such suggestions and the entire idea of a "debt to society" due to pub-
 licly-financed education appear to be based on misapprehension.
 Society is a continuing organism, and the process of financing educa-
 tion represents an intergeneration transfer of resources under which
 the currently productive generation taxes itself to educate the young,
 who in turn upon maturity provide for the next generation of children
 and so on. What is relevant for our purposes of analysis is that the av-
 erage burden of financing education falling on the emigrant's genera-
 tion is not changed by his departure, because he takes along not only
 his contribution to tax revenue but also his children, on whom this
 share of revenue would have been spent.
 Analogous arguments can be made for the financing of other govern-
 ment services such as defense, police protection, judicial services, etc.
 However, in all of these instances, including education, the conclusion
 that no adverse welfare effects result from a person's emigration is
 valid only if the incidence of taxes is equal to the incidence of benefits
 from government services.
 There is evidence that the enjoyment of the quantitatively most
 significant services provided by governments is largely proportional to
 the taxpayers' income, which includes return on human capital. De-
 fense-the largest item in the budget of many nations-benefits more
 those persons who, as a result of foreign conquests, would lose sizable
 stocks of assets than those who do not. Roads are used more by those
 who drive cars than those who walk. The amount of education de-
 manded by the offspring of the highly educated is likely to be above
 that demanded by the children of people with average education. Only
 relatively few government services, such as public parks and those re-
 lated directly to the welfare of the poor, contain elements of subsidy
 by high-income taxpayers. Therefore, the presumption is strong that
 the government can reduce many of the services it provides by nearly
 the same proportion by which tax revenues decline when a highly
 skilled person emigrates, changing the tax burden or income of the re-
 maining people only marginally and certainly by much less than the
 gross reduction in tax revenues suggests.
 It is true that if government services are provided through lumpy
 investment projects, reductions in government services may not be
 possible without increases in average cost. However, such increased
 burdens from reduced population are short run and last only until ei-
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 ther a new, optimum-scale plant replaces the old or as population re-
 turns to its old level. At any rate, in most countries complaining of the
 brain drain the problem is not one of possible excess capacity in public
 projects but rather one of overcrowdIng.
 It is often argued that a country loses because the highly skilled em-
 igrants would have worked on projects of great importance to the de-
 velopment of the country had they stayed at home. This argument is
 valid either if we take the nationalistic view of the country or if the
 person's work would have been associated with large external effects.
 In this case, also, the nationalistic view is to be rejected for the rea-
 sons presented earlier. While it is popular to argue that external effects
 are frequent in market economies, we have ben unable to discover
 economically significant instances where individuals provide social ser-
 vices associated with their person rather than profession for which
 they are not paid-including in work fostering economic development.
 Another frequently heard allegation is that the emigration of the
 highly educated is equivalent to a Darwinian process of selecting the
 best, which causes a reduction in the genetic "quality" of the country's
 human stock and influences national welfare in the long run. This is
 probably a valid argument in principle but its empirical significance is
 likely to be quite small, given the small relative size of the migratory
 flows and the population stocks. It should also be noted that the trans-
 mission of human characteristics through the genes is a rather unrelia-
 ble process, and that the offspring of many intellectually distinguished
 emigrants never achieve their parents' level of attainment.
 IV
 While our analysis so far suggests that the emigration of highly
 skilled persons reduces the welfare of the remaining people only under
 rather rare circumstances, we can make a good case for the proposition
 that these types of emigrants in fact tend to increase the welfare of
 their former countrymen in several important ways.
 Historically, emigrants have been known to raise significantly the
 incomes of their families at home through remittances. In more subtle
 ways emigrants can influence policies in the country of their new resi-
 dence towards their native country, and often the emigrants retain an
 interest in their home countries' affairs, giving counsel and advice,
 which carry great weight because of the positions of independence and
 prestige they hold in the foreign country. Furthermore, the very act of
 emigration may be beneficial to those remaining behind just because of
 the public attention given to the individual's departure, which can lead
 to critical reappraisals of institutions and procedures and their ulti-
 mate modernization and improvement.
 The potentially largest benefit to the people remaining behind, how-
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 ever, may accrue through the pure research of scientists and engineers
 in the foreign countries, contrary to the often heard allegation that the
 emigration of people in these fields is the source of greatest material
 losses. The product of basic research, knowledge, is a free good becom-
 ing available to all as it is published. Since most scientists move to
 countries where conditions of work are better for them, either because
 the new country is better able to furnish research equipment or be-
 cause of stimulating colleagues, the probability is great that such
 moves increase the scientists' overall productivity. As a consequence of
 such enmigration by scientists, the native countries not only obtain the
 scientific knowledge free, but they are actually likely to get more than
 they would have had the men stayed at home. Applied research also
 tends to benefit countries other than the one in which it is first put to
 use. Reductions in the cost of production or new product develop-
 ments tend to spread through the world as a result of competition. As
 far as national prestige from scientific achievements is concerned, the
 scientists' native countries are perfectly free to claim these men as na-
 tive sons, which in no way reduces the host-country's right to be proud
 that the work was done within its borders.
 V
 We conclude from this analysis that the transfer of human capital
 occurring when highly skilled people emigrate between countries al-
 ways reduces the economic and military power of the migrant's native
 country, though by a smaller amount than it is often alleged. We have
 argued, however, that such concern with the effects on economic and
 military power is anachronistic and that a concern with the individual
 welfare of the population ought to take its place. From this point of
 view it was seen that the emigration of highly skilled persons is likely
 to cause economic losses in the short run until replacements for the
 emigrants can be trained. Long-run losses in a market economy are
 likely to be small and are primarily associated with externalities and
 with elements of income redistribution, in the government's tax and ex-
 penditure policies. Benefits to the native countries of the emigrants may
 be sizable, primarily because much of the output of highly skilled per-
 sons, especially scientists and engineers, tends to benefit the people of
 all countries. A good case can therefore be made for a continuation of
 present policies and the free movement of human capital throughout
 the world.
